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WRONGFUL BIRTH DAMAGES:
MANDATE AND MISHANDLING BY
JUDICIAL FIAT
INTRODUCTION
At one time, procreation was thought to be the chief purpose of
marriage.' That idea has ceased to enjoy popularity. Today for many
people the addition of another mouth to feed is no longer a "blessed
event."2 In fact, it is something they wish to avoid. Thus, the prac-
tices of contraceptive use, abortion, and sterilization have increased
in recent years,3 and so, inevitably, has the number of related
lawsuits." Among the most controversial of the ensuing causes of ac-
tion is that of "wrongful birth."5 In a wrongful birth action the
1. See Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45 (Lycoming Cty. 1957).
2. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 475 (1967);
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. - , 260 N.W.2d 169, 173 (1977).
3. A. GUTTMACHER, PREGNANCY, BIRTH AND FAMILY PLANNING 306 (1973).
4. Among these suits is one type not directly addressed in this note, viz., prod-
ucts liability suits for birth control pills or devices. In Whittington v. Eli Lilly and Co.,
333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W. Va. 1971), the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of an oral con-
traceptive for breach of warranty of fitness. Because the product had been advertised
as "virtually" 100% effective, the claim was denied.
5. Wrongful birth actions are often confused with suits for "wrongful life." A
suit for wrongful life is brought by the child himself to recover damages for wrongfully
being born, and is not necessarily confined to the context of birth control failure. For
instance, in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), a child sued
his father for allowing him to be born illegitimate. Actions for wrongful life have been
unsuccessful, with only two exceptions. See Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories,
Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973); Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d
110 (1977). Park granted damages for both wrongful life and wrongful birth, but was
later modified to include only the parents' claim. See note 196 infra and accompanying
text.
The term "wrongful life" has been employed by courts in referring to two
disparate situations. Besides the type of action represented by Zepeda, Jorgensen, or
Park, wherein negligence has caused a child to be conceived, there is also the situation
presented when a child conceived absent negligence of a third party is permitted to
live due to a negligently performed abortion. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App.
3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976). Clearly there is a distinction: in one context, the
wrong begins with conception; in the other, the wrong occurs later. The "wrongful life"
in Stills is the unsuccessful killing, rather than the creation of life. Adding to the con-
fusion, rather than solving the problem, the court in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,-
Minn. - , 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977), labelled the cause of action there-a negligent
sterilization -"wrongful conception." Id. at 170.
As used in this note, the term "wrongful birth" stands for the type of lawsuit
in which a parent or parents of an unplanned child sue for the damages they allegedly
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parents of an unplanned child seek to shift to the defendant' various
costs, including medical expenses of pregnancy and delivery, pain
and suffering,7 and the more formidable costs of rearing and
educating a child.8 As the history of this litigation has progressed,
the damages claimed have been more extensive.
The litigation arises in several contexts. Malpracticed steriliza-
tion operations, including both tubal ligations and vasectomies9 con-
stitute the major number of suits. Included also are failures to
diagnose pregnancy in time for abortion and failures to perform suc-
cessful abortions. The suits are brought mainly on the basis of
negligence."0 However, breach of warranty,1 breach of contract,
2
and misrepresentation" have also been alleged as bases of liability.
Often the tort and contract bases are pleaded alternatively. 4
These situations seem to fit easily into a negligent tort context:
there is duty, 5 breach, proximate cause, and ostensible damage.
have incurred as a result of his conception or birth, or both. Pretermitting its self-
assigned label, Sherlock is treated as a suit for wrongful birth, as is Stills.
6. Usually the defendant in such a case is a physician, clinic, or hospital.
However, in Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), the defendant
was a pharmacist who negligently substituted tranquilizers for the plaintiffs birth con-
trol prescription. Suits against physicians often include co-defendants. See, e.g., Rogala
v. Silva, 16 Ill. App. 3d 63, 305 N.E.2d 571 (1973) (hospital director); Hackworth v.
Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Tenn. 1971) (lab technician).
7. Two varieties of pain and suffering have been recognized. In addition to
that suffered in the course of childbirth, pain and suffering in raising a child has been
approved as compensable. See Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336
(1975).
8. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). This
is not to say, however, that all types of damages are always claimed. In Bishop v.
Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967), the plaintiffs did not claim rearing costs as
damages; conversely, in Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), those
were the only damages claimed.
9. Negligence is particularly difficult to prove in vasectomy cases, due to the
frequency of recanalization. See Lombard, Vasectomy, 10 SUFFOLK L. REv. 25, 43
(1975). This contingency led to the verdict for defendant in Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d
247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
10. See, e.g., Lane v. Cohen, 201 So. 2d 804 (Fla. App. 1967); Troppi v. Scarf,
31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230,
357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
11. See, e.g., Rogala v. Silva, 16 11. App. 3d 63, 305 N.E.2d 571 (1973); Cole-
man v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
12. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Sanders, 266 S.C. 394, 223 S.E.2d 602 (1976).
13. See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
14. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
15. As in all other medical malpractice actions, the physician is bound to the
standard of the skill and learning possessed by other members of the profession in
good standing. See generally W. PROSSER. LAW OF TORTS § 32 at 162 (4th ed. 1971).
16. The causation issue has been carried to extremes. For example, some
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However, the underlying issues are not quite so simple, and the
courts are not agreed on the questions of whether damage exists
and, if so, what the measure of damages should be. This note
challenges the simplistic tort treatment accorded wrongful birth
damages in most jurisdictions. The discussion begins with the ques-
tion of injury. Then, assuming that injury does exist, the note traces
the issues involved in measuring damages, including the questions of
speculation, benefits conferred, and mitigation. Without correct ap-
plication of these three principles to reduce or eliminate damages,
the recoverable damages represent an undue financial burden on
defendants, completely disproportionate to the injury involved.
While there is some authority for the proposition that the birth
of an unplanned child constitutes no injury," the more prevalent and
arguably more sensible approach is to admit that it does. It does not
follow, however, that where injury exists, damages must always" be
awarded. 8 Indeed, in the wrongful birth context, there are several
reasons for which recovery can and should be denied. Public policy
considerations, particularly those concerning the child's well-being
and the possibility of fraud, should militate against recovery."
Moreover, despite the finding of injury, the cause of action itself is
unknown at common law and should await legislative action, rather
than arise as judicial fiat." Thus, it would appear that the courts
have had sufficient reason to deny recovery of wrongful birth
damages.
The majority of courts permit recovery of damages which can
be ascertained only through speculation and conjecture. This is true
because the majority approach allows recovery for all consequential
damages proximately caused by the defendant's act."' However, the
limitation of proximate cause, when applied to the "wrong" of
human life, is really no limitation at all: a human life is a complex,
ongoing entity, interacting in diverse ways with other lives and in-
terests. Recognition of this problem of speculation should lead to
defendants have called the act of sexual intercourse an "intervening cause" which cuts
off their liability. See, e.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 464 (S.D.W. Va. 1967);
Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (1967). This defense has
been unsuccessful.
17. See Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming Cty. 1957).
18. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244
(1974).
19. Ld. at 245.
20. Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc.2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (1977).
21. See, e.g., Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975).
See also Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
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denial or restriction of damages, yet it has been addressed by only a
few courts.' It is clear that the only damages which can be assessed
with reasonable certainty are the costs of pregnancy and delivery.
Unless such a limitation is imposed, the damages recoverable are
both speculative in nature and indefinite in scope.23
If damages are not denied on grounds of public policy or
speculation, they should be diminished in two ways. First, they
should be depleted by the amount of benefit accruing to the plain-
tiffs. Just as there are various sorts of apparent injury involved in
the birth of an unplanned child, there are also various benefits con-
ferred by his addition to the family. A true application of the benefit
rule" would involve weighing each type of benefit against each cor-
responding type of detriment. The usual approach, however, is to
view the total benefit as outweighed by the total costs. 5 The next
manner in which damages should be limited is by application of the
rule of avoidable consequences. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to
recover damages which could have been avoided by reasonable con-
duct. Abortion and adoption may in some cases be reasonable alter-
natives to delivering and raising an unplanned child, and thus should
be considered on the issue of mitigation. Nevertheless, it has been
held as a matter of law that such alternative conduct should not be
required." Since the benefit rule has been viewed too simplistically,
and where the doctrine of avoidable consequences has been ar-
bitrarily rejected, courts should now reconsider their positions.
By not implementing restrictions on recovery, courts have
created more present and potential 7 problems than they have solved.
They have perhaps succeeded in establishing a deterrent to
negligent conduct, but they have unjustly enriched plaintiffs and im-
posed undue financial burdens on defendants. It is now time for the
courts to re-examine their approaches to wrongful birth damages.
This re-examination should begin with the question of whether in-
jury and a cause of action should be recognized.
22. See, e.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242
(1974).
23. See id at 245.
24. The benefit rule requires that where the defendant causes harm to the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's property but at the same time confers a benefit to that same
interest, the value of the benefit should be used to offset the damages. See RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939).
25. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
26. Id at 519-20.
27. See Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242
(1974). In that case, one reason for denying recovery was that the tort would have no
just or sensible stopping point. Id at 245.
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INJURY IN FACT AND CAUSE OF ACTION
For liability to arise in a cause of action founded upon
negligence, more than conduct must be present. Besides duty,
breach of duty, and proximate cause, a negligent tort action requires
actual loss or damage to the interests of another party.28 In the
wrongful birth context the question becomes whether the parents of
the unplanned child have suffered injury as a result of the alleged
malpractice. Unmistakably, pregnancy and child-raising cost money;
yet treating unplanned parenthood as a civil wrong has elicited
radically different reactions from the courts. Jurists do not agree
whether any injury exists, and those who agree there is injury
disagree on whether a wrongful birth cause of action is cognizable at
law. Although some courts hold otherwise, 9 it is realistic to admit
that the birth of an unplanned child constitutes injury.0 Such a
realization, however, does not mandate the awarding of damages if
public policy dictates differently. 1 There are significant policy con-
siderations militating against full recovery for wrongful birth. Fur-
thermore, because the action is previously unknown at common law
and involves moral and ethical issues, the decision of whether a
cause of action exists would most appropriately lie with state
legislatures.2 Yet in spite of the far-reaching issues, these initial
questions of injury in fact and cause of action have been decided only
by courts.
Presently the majority view is that an unplanned child is an in-
jury to his parents. This viewpoint began to find increasing accep-
tance in the late 1960's, possibly as a result of the Supreme Court
decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut33 and Roe v. Wade.' Dicta in
Roe painted unwanted pregnancy as clearly injurious:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm
may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed
by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
28. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30 at 143 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
29. See, e.g., Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45 (Lycoming Cty. 1957).
30. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. __ , 260 N.W.2d 169,
175 (1977). The court in that case declared it is myopic to view the unplanned child
nowadays as anything but a net loss.
31. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244
(1974).
32. Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc.2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (1977).
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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associated with the unwanted child, and there is the prob-
lem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.3"
Moreover, as is often pointed out, the sheer volume of contraceptive
practice in the United States" demonstrates that child-bearing and
child-rearing are tasks that persons wish to avoid. What was once a
"blessed event"37 is now a disease 8 or disability. 9
Notwithstanding the dicta in Roe, wrongful birth decisions offer
little explanation of how unplanned human life constitutes injury to
parents." The majority apparently find injury per se in whatever
consequences flow from the negligent act." Without explaining why
injury exists, they hold that all provable injuries must be compen-
sated."
While most courts do not separate consequences of birth con-
trol failure into injuries and non-injuries, some have recognized a
positive element in parenthood. To reconcile the conflicting aspects
of such consequences, they have employed the "offsetting benefit"
rule, subtracting the value of the benefit from the cost of the
injury.' Of course, such an approach is predicated upon the ex-
istence of injury. It does not go so far as to deem unplanned parent-
35. Id. at 153.
36. During the first half of this decade, an estimated 3,566,000 men in this
country voluntarily became sterilized. See Lombard, Vasectomy, 10 SUFFOLK L. REV.
25 (1975). Recent studies also indicate that sterilization is fast becoming the preferred
contraceptive measure among married persons. Statistics in 1975 showed that 6.8
million couples had chosen sterilization, while only 7.1 million married women used oral
contraceptives. See Sterilization Becoming Top Birth Control The Minneapolis Star,
July 22, 1977, at 1A, col. 1.
37. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 475 (1967).
38. In a paper presented before the annual convention of the Association of
Planned Parenthood Physicians, three doctors from the Center for Disease Control in
Atlanta referred to pregnancy as "the Number Two Sexually Transmitted Disease."
See National Right to Life News, January, 1977, at 10, col. 2. Moreover, the chief of
abortion surveillance at the CDC contends that so labelling pregnancy is
demonstrative of restraint, inasmuch as the most widely read text on obstetrical pro-
cedure refers to unwanted pregnancy as a "venereal disease." See National Right to
Life News, March, 1977, at 9, col. 2.
39. Cf. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (disability not
covered by company's insurance plan).
40. See, e.g., Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. App. 1970); Bowman v.
Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
41. See, e.g., Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975).
42. Id. at 340.
43. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517-18
(1971).
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hood a benefit; rather, it labels parenthood an injury with beneficial
aspects."
A more radical approach, taken by only one court,45 is division
of ensuing consequences into compensable and non-compensable in-
juries. This procedure has resulted in separation of pregnancy costs
from child-rearing costs."6 In so doing, it compromises the two
dichotomous viewpoints on wrongful birth, by compensating what
nearly every court agrees is an injury 7 and denying recovery for
what the courts cannot agree is injurious. 8 Thus, while taking a
somewhat moral stance, the decision rests firmly on legal principles.
Although it severely restricts recovery, it admits the existence of
injury.
Some courts, however, have declined to hold that an un-
planned child constitutes injury. One approach taken to reach this
conclusion appears to be nothing more than a private, nonobjective
feeling on the part of a particular judge or jury. For instance,
one court held that because the plaintiff parents would neither place
the child for adoption nor sell the child, the jurors as reasonable
persons might well conclude that no injury was suffered and that
the cost of birth was "far outweighed by the blessing of a cherished
child."" Besides its problem of patent subjectivity, this holding con-
fuses the question of injury with two other issues. As mentioned
earlier, the injury question is distinguishable from the question of
offsetting benefits; however, some cases purporting to hold there is
no damage do so on the basis of the overriding benefits.* Further-
more, such a holding blurs the distinction between injury and
mitiiation of damages." The questionable conclusion reached is that
by failing to mitigate their alleged injury by abortionn or adop-
44. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __ Minn. __ , 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977).
45. See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974), affd, 349 A.2d 8
(Del. 1975).
46. Id. at 761.
47. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __ Minn. __ , 260 N.W.2d 169
(1977).
48. Compare Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45 (Lycoming Cty. 1957)
with Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 475 (1967).
49. Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201, 204 (1964).
50. See, e.g., Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
51. This blurred distinction occurs in the earlier cases, before courts began to
suggest that wrongful birth lends itself easily to applications of tort law.
52. While it has been suggested that the failure to abort indicates no damage
has been incurred, most courts apparently believe abortion is too drastic a measure to
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tion," plaintiffs have impliedly stated they have suffered no
damage" or have suffered damage wholly outweighed by the
benefits of parenthood." Clearly, the issues are separate: in other
tort situations, the failure of a plaintiff to mitigate damages may
curtail or preclude his recovery, but does not prove that no injury
has occurred." Thus, the usual logic employed to find a lack of in-
jury cannot withstand close scrutiny.
Another approach taken to find no injury is quite logical, but
has been applied by only one court. This approach looks to the pur-
pose for which the birth control method was sought or employed, in
order to determine whether the plaintiff's interests have been in-
jured. In Christensen v. Thornby,57 the first wrongful birth case, the
plaintiff husband had undergone a vasectomy to avoid impregnating
his wife. Childbirth, according to the couple's physician, would have
endangered the wife's life.58 The subsequent delivery was unevent-
ful, but the husband brought suit against the doctor who had at-
tempted the sterilization. The court denied relief, stating that
because the purpose of the operation was not to save the expense
incident to childbirth, the plaintiff's interests had not been in-
terfered with: "Instead of losing his wife, the plaintiff has been
blessed with the fatherhood of another child." 9 Avoidance of
pregnancy and delivery costs, said the court, was "remote" from the
alleged purpose of the sterilization. The Christensen holding cor-
rectly recognizes that the consequences resulting from unsuccessful
birth control may not always be the consequences which the plaintiff
sought to avoid. A more simplistic evaluation of injury, ignoring the
purpose of the contraceptive practice, would permit recovery even
be required for purposes of mitigation. Mitigation is not even addressed in the majority of
cases. However, the strongest statement against abortion was made in the major case
on wrongful birth recovery. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511,
520 (1971).
53. Adoption, rather than abortion, was referred to in both Shaheen and Bal.
the two cases which most clearly blur the distinction between damage and mitigation.
Both decisions, it should be noted, were rendered prior to Roe v. Wade.
54. See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. 1974), affd, 349
A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Young v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 291 F. Supp.
447 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
57. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
58. While several cases have involved sterilizations performed to protect the
wife's health, Christensen is the only case in which the woman's life was in danger.
See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
59. 255 N.W. at 622.
60. Id.
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when a plaintiff is clearly benefitted.' Determination of purpose,
moreover, is a very subtle bit of reasoning, grounded on the belief
that injury is relative to intent."
Despite its ascendancy in logic, such an approach presents dif-
ficulties in its application. While the explanation most often given
for the use of contraceptive measures is avoidance of child-raising
expenses, 3 plaintiffs have often pleaded both health and financial
reasons." Making the purpose test impractical to administer, one
plaintiff pleaded health and financial purposes alternatively." Addi-
tional problems arise since reliance upon success of birth control
may produce further interests not contemplated at the time of con-
sultation with the physician.6 Consequently, although evaluation of
purpose removes determination of injury from the subjective feel-
ings of individual judges and juries, it is simply not practicable.
The subjective nature of decisions holding no injury to exist as
a matter of law becomes more visible when the unplanned child is
abnormal. Two jurisdictions which do not permit recovery for the
birth of a normal, healthy child do allow damages for a child born
with defects. The compensable injury in such cases is the financial
detriment generated by the defects." Unless it can be stated as a
matter of law that a child's value to his parents is a function of his
physical health or intelligence quotient, these holdings should be
recognized as manifestations of personal prejudice, rather than legal
concepts of injury.
61. For example, a couple might fervently desire to have a child, and might be
financially willing and able to support him, but, like the Christensens, be advised to
avoid pregnancy due to expected complications in childbirth. If the delivery were
uneventful, it would appear that the negligence had bestowed upon the parents a
definite benefit without injury.
62. It is interesting to note that the court in Troppi made much of evaluating
the purpose of the contraceptive method with reference to the benefit conferred. It did
not, however, suggest that such a determination should bear upon the initial designa-
tion of injury. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 340, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971).
63. See, e.g., Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
64. See, e.g., Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201, 203 (1964).
65. See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 760 (Del. Super. 1974), aff'd 349
A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
66. For instance, a couple might choose an early retirement, believing no
more children would be born to them.
67. See Jacobs v. Thiemer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). See also Becker v. Schwartz, 47
U.S.L.W. 2426 (N.Y. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1978).
68. See note 67 supra.
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At the same time, the holding of no injury in the case of a
deformed child seems equally subjective and artificial. Such a
holding was made in a case in which a physician had failed to ap-
prise the parents that the mother's having contracted rubella during
her pregnancy might harm the fetus. 9 When the child was born with
defects, the parents sued, claiming they would have aborted the
fetus if the prognosis had been known."0  While voicing its
sympathy,7 the court held damages not recoverable due to the
'preciousness of the single human life. '7 2 Thus, no clear explanation
of the lack of injury was given. Perhaps in recognition of that fact,
the court based its denial of recovery on the added theory that
wrongful birth does not constitute a cause of action."
Even if an injury does exist, there may be no cause of action
for wrongful birth. Recognizing the singular nature of these
lawsuits, and admitting the suits were not previously known at com-
mon law, some courts have justifiably balked at the prospect of
creating a new tort. They have voiced the opinion that because
these actions are complex, and involve substantial moral and ethical
issues, recovery cannot be permitted absent legislative approval.74
One court stated:
[Ilf a cause of action of this particular nature ... should be
sanctioned, it should be by the duly elected legislature
after complete public debate. A decision of this nature in-
volving conflicting mores and far flung social ramifications
should not depend upon the personal religious and social
views of a particular judge or jury."M
Waiting for the state legislatures to act, therefore, would obviate
the problem of subjectivity in determining injury. Interestingly, the
same sentiment has been echoed in virtually every lawsuit for
69.. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
70. Id, at 691.
71. The court expressed its condolences for what it termed "the unfortunate
situation in which [the] parents find themselves." Nevertheless, the court found that
the child's "right to live" precluded the parents' "right not to endure emotional and
financial injury." 227" A.2d at 693. It is therefore questionable that the court would
have come to the same decision in a context not involving abortion. Indeed, the opinion
was later distinguished on that ground in Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344
A.2d 204 (1975).
72. 227 A.2d at 693.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (1977).
75. Maley v. Armstrong, IV Reporter on Human Reproduction C-13, C-15.
This 1967 case, not generally reported, may well have been the first case tried in the
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wrongful life.76 Until a recent exception, 7 state courts in those situa-
tions had adhered to their deferential stance, refusing to recognize
the cause of action without legislative guidance. Since wrongful
birth and wrongful life cases involve basically the same moral
issues,"8 activism in one context and passivity in the other make little
sense. The more acceptable approach is deference to the
legislatures.
Most courts have not deferred such a decision, however, and
what has ensued is unmistakable legislation by the judiciary. Not only
have the courts created a previously unknown cause of action,7 they
have even assumed the task of delineating compensable damages.
Recent wrongful birth decisions have become the counterparts of
wrongful death statutes,8 even though wrongful death suits met with
judicial reluctance until popular pressure produced legislation.2
Because the perceived injury in wrongful death cases required a
complex computation of damages, taking into account the prospect
of valuing human life, exact and thoughtful legislation was deemed
appropriate. For the same reasons, it is appropriate in the wrongful
birth context for courts to refrain from legislating.
It is apparent that a court's determination of no injury in the
wrongful birth context is a subjective, strained, and artificial way in
which to prevent recovery. However, recovery can be denied for
other reasons, including considerations of public policy. Before
recognizing or refusing to recognize the injury or cause of action,
United States wherein the "Pill" was at issue as contrasted to the vasectomy or
sterilization operation.
76. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, 859 (1963).
77. Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified,
Becker v. Schwartz, 47 U.S.L.W. 2426 (N.Y. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1978) (companion case to
Park v. Chessin).
78. In Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __ Minn. __ , 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977),
the court recognized it was faced with the issues, but decided the case notwithstanding
them. Id. at 174. In Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), the
court stated at the outset: "resolution of the case before use requires no intrusion into
the domain of moral philosophy." Id. at 513.
79. See Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc.2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (1977).
80. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __ Minn. __ , 260 N.W.2d 169
(1977).
81. Compare Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __ Minn. __ , 260 N.W.2d 169
(1977) with ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-909 (1962) and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West. Supp.
1978) and IND. CODE § 34-1-1-2 (1976) and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (West. Supp. 1978).
82. See, e.g., Grosso v. Delaware, Lackawana & Western R.R. Co., 50 N.J.L.
317, 13 A. 233 (1888); Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867). See generally F. TIFFANY,
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT § 16 (1893); Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Com-
mon Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960).
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therefore, courts should consider the public policy implications of
wrongful birth.
Public Policy'
Considerations of public policy have been employed to mandate
wrongful birth recovery, as well as to deny it. Because public policy
83. Public policy cannot be fully analyzed without a determination of what it
is and where it originates. A standard definition of "public policy" reads:
the community common sense and common conscience extended and ap-
plied throughout the state to matters of public morals, public health,
public safety, public welfare, and the like; . . . that general and well-
settled public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable duty to his fellow
men having due regard to all the circumstances of each particular relation
and situation.
Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (1916).
According to the Supreme Court, the very essence of public policy is the interest of
persons other than the parties. See Beasley v. Texas & P.R. Co., 191 U.S. 492, 498
(1903). Therefore, taking the general welfare into account, a state may impose its
views and values upon the parties to a lawsuit. Indeed, such has been done in various
types of actions where damages have been denied, based on overriding public con-
siderations. See, e.g., Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal. App. 2d 76, 136 P.2d 116, 120 (1943)
(public policy held to preclude cause of action for alienation of affection).
Because public policy reflects the community conscience, Hammonds v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1965), it varies with the habits,
capacities, and opportunities of the public. Chaffee v. Farmers' Coop. Elevator Co., 39
N.D. 585, 168 N.W. 616, 618 (1918). Hence, it varies with the times. Landgraver v.
Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d 301, 302 (1955). The community
conscience makes itself known in the constitution and statutes of a state. This is where
direct or indirect statements of public policy are found. See Higgins v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 50 Ala. App. 691, 282 So. 2d 295, 298 (1973); Dairyland County Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Wallgreen, 477 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). Thus, public policy is
somewhat narrower than a national trend, being more uniquely attributable to a state
than to a nation.
If public policy appears in state statutes, its origin is clear: the legislators who
make the state statutes must be the formulators of state policy. In Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519 (1977), a different conclusion was reached, but through similar reasoning. The
Supreme Court there ruled that a city's mayor might institute practices on the basis of
policy, because of his status as an elected official.
In most wrongful birth cases, however, courts have not looked to the policies
designated by elected officials, whether executive or legislative. For instance, in Troppi
v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 340, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), the court stated:
To say that for reasons of public policy contraceptive failure can result in
no damage as a matter of law ignores the fact that tens of millions of per-
sons use contraceptives daily to avoid the very result which the defen-
dant would have us say is always a benefit, never a detriment. Those tens
of millions of persons, by their conduct, express the sense of the com-
munity.
Id at 517. In reaching the opposite conclusion, another court observed, "We are of the
opinion that to allow damages for the birth of a normal child is foreign to the universal
public sentiment of the people." Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45 (Lycoming
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changes with the times,' courts should give it recurring attention.
Presently there are significant reasons for precluding recovery or
denying the wrongful birth cause of action altogether. Thus, the prob-
lems of evaluating wrongful birth damages could be avoided by in-
voking public policy.
Assuming that the birth of a child, normal or abnormal, does
constitute an injury to his parents, public policy considerations may
nevertheless militate against recovery. The issue of public policy
has been raised in virtually ' every wrongful birth action.' That
issue has assumed two forms: one argument is that the birth control
method itself is against public policy; the other is that public policy
is contravened by awarding damages in the event of birth control
failure. With the advent of national and state family plannng pro-
grams,"7 the first argument has become wholly unpersuasive." It
was quickly dismissed even when first raised in 1934,89 and has since
been resurrected only in wrongful birth cases involving abortion."
At present, its only use can be where state laws prohibit abortion in
the time frame in which the abortion was desired, sought, or per-
formed. The broad sweep of Roe v. Wade renders such application
Cty. 1957). The Shaheen court did not explain how it came to perceive that public sen-
timent; the Troppi opinion ignores the fact that an act, albeit by millions, may violate
state policies and state laws. Witness the widespread use of marijuana in this country.
A wrongful birth holding that because many people practice birth control,
public policy commands recovery, would thus be a misapplication of law. If a court
chooses to look at the number of people desiring to limit their family size, it might just
as well observe the overwhelming number who desire to adopt others' unwanted
children. See Kwitny, Suicide, Motherhood And Madness-But Not Adoption? Wall
St. J., Dec. 2, 1977, at 14, col. 6. Either approach would ignore the Supreme Court's
directive in Poelker. The more sensible approach would be to allow the majority to set
policies through their elected officials.
84. Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d 301,
302 (1955).
85. In Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976), the
issue of public policy was not raised; the court, declining to raise the issue sua sponte,
held it must be waived.
86. E.g., Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. App. 1970); Troppi v. Scarf,
31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn.
-_ , 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977).
87. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.14b (1968).
88. For a discussion of the historical perspective, and the arguments that
sterilization should be against public policy, see Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability
in the Practice of Surgery, 14 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 233, 277-84 (1942).
89. See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620, 621 (1934).
90. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Thiemer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. 1975).
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particularly unlikely, by severely restricting state action in the
abortion situation.91
However, the argument that recovery conflicts with public
policy is raised frequently in wrongful birth cases, and has been
dealt with in different ways. A few courts have denied recovery
altogether on grounds of policy;92 another has permitted only partial
recovery. 3 Finally, some courts have metamorphosed the moribund
argument that sterilization is itself in contravention of public policy.
Turning the argument around, these courts have held that public
policy necessitates the awarding of damages.' The suggestion is
that because national policy favors family planning, it looks with
favor on the awarding of damages whenever such planning goes
awry; or, in its negative form, that because states may not interfere
with the right to limit family size, they may not refuse damages
when that right is negligently disrupted.95 While the prohibition of
recovery finds more than adequate support in policy considerations,
the opposite approach is not so convincing.
That public policy can be employed to deny wrongful birth
recovery is best illustrated by Rieck v. Medical Protective Co.,9" in
which the court found more than one policy argument sufficient to
preclude awarding damages. The case recognized the injustice of the
unplanned child's rearing costs not being proportionate to a physi-
cian's culpability.97 For this reason, the court suggested, wrongful
birth recovery would unreasonably burden physicians.9" The court
also observed that recovery would open the way for fraudulent
claims." While Rieck pointed to both these reasons, either of them
would be sufficient to justify denial of recovery.
91. Although Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is frequently cited the the prop-
osition that states may not prohibit abortions within the first trimester of pregnancy,
the de'cision reaches much further. With regard to the final three months, for instance,
the Court stated that a state could not prohibit abortion during that period if the abor-
tion were necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Moreover, in Doe v.
Bolto, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), "health" includes both physical and emotional health. Thus,
what appears to be limited abortion is really closer to abortion on demand.
92. See, e.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242
(1974).
93. See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974), affd, 349 A.2d 8
(Del. 1975).
94. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 516-17
(1971).
95. See Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976).
96. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
97. Id at 245.
98. Id
99. Id
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As Rieck correctly demonstrates, shifting the costs of raising a
child to the defendant physician imposes undue financial burdens on
physicians, while allowing parents to retain all benefits:
To permit the parents to keep their child and shift
the entire cost of its upbringing to a physician . . . would
be to create a new category of surrogate parent. Every
child's smile, every bond of love and affection, every
reason for parental pride in a child's achievements, every
contribution by the child to the welfare and well-being of
the family and parents, is to remain with the parents ....
[Elvery financial cost or detriment ... would be shifted to
the physician. °°
This "surrogate parent" argument can be supported, by analogy,
with other policy decisions on family law. For instance, a father may
not contract away his obligation to support his child."' Similarly,
separation agreements attempting to relieve husbands of their
duties to support their wives are against public policy, and therefore
unenforceable.'2 Clearly, state policies favor leaving support duties
within the family.
Moreover, the Rieck rationale has the further effect of prevent-
ing crippling financial burdens on physicians, thus ensuring medical
help by willing physicians at reasonable prices. °3 Granted, the op-
posite approach would certainly spread the risks, by means of
malpractice insurance. But if, in fact, liability is not proportionate to
culpability, it is more reasonable to place the risk with those who
derive the benefits.
Perhaps the strongest policy reason for denying recovery is
that wrongful birth invites fraudulent claims." ' By its very nature,
such an action involves the pleading of a mental state. While the
parents may initially desire to avoid having children, there is no
guarantee that this wish continues throughout the pregnancy and
after childbirth. This problem becomes especially acute since courts
have almost universally declined to require parents in such an action
to mitigate damages, by either aborting the fetus or placing the
100. Id. at 244.
101. See, e.g., Massey v. Flinn, 198 Ark. 279, 128 S.W.2d 1008, 1012 (1939).
102. See, e.g., Myles v. Arnold, 162 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
103. The significant state interest in rising malpractice costs has led one state
to restrict malpractice liability by statute. See IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2 (1976).
104. See Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242
(1974).
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child for adoption." 5 Because courts will not inquire into the parents'
motives in declining to exercise these options, plaintiffs' claims are
virtually immunized from defenses charging fraud.
Fraud is especially a problem where the action involves
nothing more than a failure to diagnose pregnancy, the plaintiff learn-
ing later that she is pregnant and that state law prohibits abortion.
In such a case, the plaintiff mother need only allege that she would
have had an abortion, had there been time. Under the present case
law, every woman whose doctor fails to diagnose her pregnancy
could bring a wrongful birth action and hold the doctor accountable
for every cost of rearing and educating the child. Unless physicians
are to be subjected to claims such as this, courts must deny
recovery, and the vehicle of public policy appears the most
pragmatic way of accomplishing that objective.
Additionally, public policy should be invoked to protect the in-
terests of the child himself. Although the Rieck court did not base
its denial of recovery on this consideration, it stated: "We do not
understand this complaint as implying any present rejection or
future strain upon the parent-child relationship.""' Another court,
however, did use this theory in limiting recovery to the costs of
pregnancy and delivery."7 In so doing, this court indicated it wished
to avoid "the unfortunate prospect of ruling, as a matter of law, that
under certain circumstances a child would not be worth the trouble
and expense necessary to bring him into the world."' It has also
been feared that such a ruling would render the unplanned child an
"emotional bastard.""' Such arguments constitute viable policy
reasons for denying or restricting wrongful birth recovery.
Attempting to rebut these arguments, courts allowing full
recovery have suggested that the child should not be thought of as
unloved, but as unplanned."0 Indeed, some courts have dismissed the
contention by stating that a child learning of his parents' wrongful
birth suit will feel no differently than he would upon learning of
their own ineptitude at birth control."' This reasoning overlooks two
105. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 521 (1971).
106. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 at 245-46.
107. See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974), affd, 349 A.2d 8
(1975).
108. 327 A.2d at 761.
109. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 at 45.
110. See, e.g., Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1970).
111. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477
(1967); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __ Minn. __ 260 N.W.2d 169, 173 (1977).
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important facts: first, the suits often allege that the parents would
have aborted the child, had they had the opportunity; 2 second, com-
plainants frequently seek damages for pain and suffering far in ex-
cess of the costs of raising the child.11 One partial solution, im-
plemented in only one case, is to use a pseudonym in place of the
parents' names."' It is doubtful, however, that this measure would
prevent the child from learning of the lawsuit from his family and
relatives. Thus, the view that there will be no adverse effect on the
unplanned child is simply unrealistic, and courts should utilize policy
arguments to prevent psychological trauma.
Adverse effect on family relationships might also prove reason
enough to deny the cause of action. One distinguished jurist has
labelled wrongful birth actions as suits which "pit parent against
child.""' 5 Although he has never decided a wrongful birth case,
Justice Rehnquist believes they are examples of situations in which
individual rights should bow to institutional rights."' By denying
either recovery or the cause of action, courts could remove
themselves as forums for disruption of family harmony. Public policy
considerations are more than adequate to achieve this result.
Using the public policy rationale to require recovery for
wrongful birth is questionable in light of some recent decisions.
Recovery in a leading case, Troppi v. Scarf, 7 was predicated upon
two policy considerations. After citing the state's family planning
services as evidence of policy favoring contraception,"8 the court
relied on Griswold, stating:
Contraception has been held to be within a constitu-
tionally protected 'zone of privacy' . . . . The state may
112. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Thiemer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
113. See, e.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242,
243 (1974).
114. See Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976).
115. Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1978, at A6, col. 1. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, ad-
dressing law students at the University of Miami, commented on the Sherlock case:
What is the effect of such a lawsuit going to be upon this child from the
time of his birth through the subsequent 17 or 18 years which he will in
the normal course of events spend with the parents? To pit children
against their parents in [the courts] . . .may leave the family unit in a
shambles.
Id.
116. See Will, When Individual Rights Must Yield, Washington Post, Mar. 16,
1978, at A23, col. 3.
117. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
118. Id. at 516-17.
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not infringe upon the rights of a husband and wife to use
contraceptives to limit the size of their family. Since the
state may not infringe upon this right, it may not constitu-
tionally denigrate the right by completely denying protec-
tion provided as a matter of course to such rights." 9
This argument has been interpreted in another case to mean a state
may not prefer some types of malpractice over others, by granting
damages only in certain instances. 0 In the few years following
Griswold and Roe, such holdings were probably inevitable. However,
the strength of those decisions has been eroded somewhat by subse-
quent cases; thus, the position that public policy mandates recovery
may now be too extreme.
Assuming, arguendo, that denial of recovery constitutes state
interference with rights, there is still evidence in two recent
Supreme Court decisions that certain amounts of state interference
with such rights will be tolerated. In Maher v. Roe,'2' the Court held
the State of Connecticut could exclude nontherapeutic abortions
from its federally funded Medicaid program without impinging upon
the constitutional right of a woman to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy. Holding that the state action was not interference
with the right to privacy, the Court stated, "There is a basic dif-
ference between direct state interference with a protected activity
and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with
legislative policy."'" Thus, a court could reasonably deny recovery
for rearing and educating an unplanned child, in order to encourage
adoption of such children. This would constitute something less than
"direct state interference," and would be based on sound policy.
Similarly, in Poelker v. Doe "'3 the City of St. Louis was upheld
in electing, as a policy choice, to provide publicly financed hospital
services for childbirth without providing corresponding services for
nontherapeutic abortions. The Constitution, said the Court, does not
forbid a state or city from expressing such a preference for
childbirth, since a state has a vital interest in potential human life."'
Surely that interest should extend to preclude damages which might
psychologically affect life adversely. Undoubtedly, in light of these
119. Id at 517.
120. See Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976).
121. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
122. Id. at 475.
123. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
124. Id at 521.
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two decisions, the holding that constitutional law mandates recovery
is no longer sound.
The Troppi holding admits of two other closely related
fallacies. While the court could have limited recovery to pregnancy
and delivery expenses, it based its decision on the theory that it
could not "completely deny" damages because of constitutional prin-
ciples.125 Employing the same sort of reasoning, the court held that
damages were required for their deterrent effect: "To absolve defen-
dant of all liability here would be to remove one deterrent against
the negligent dispensing of drugs.1 ... Of course, wrongful birth
recovery might prove a deterrent to negligence; nevertheless, it is
questionable that recovery must be granted for all types of alleged
damages in order to provide that prophylactic effect.1" Manifestly,
holdings such as that of Troppi require logical re-evaluation.
In fact, the entire question of recovery should be re-examined.
Although it is artificial to conclude that no injury is suffered in the
birth of an unplanned child, the determination of injury does not end
the inquiry. Not only recovery but also the cause of action itself
were heretofore unknown at common law, and, because of their com-
plexity, might best be left for legislative decision. To avoid deciding
the issues themselves, courts should look to public policy for reasons
to deny recovery, limit it, or deny the cause of action altogether.
Public policy could be employed, among other reasons, to prevent
fraudulent claims and to protect the unplanned child's emotion well-
being. Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that courts would
be justified in denying or restricting recovery. Unless this is done,
courts must embark upon the labyrinthine path of measuring
damages.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
If a cause of action for wrongful birth is recognized, and public
policy considerations are not employed to deny recovery or restrict
125. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971).
126. Id (Emphasis added.)
127. It is interesting to note that deterrence is regarded as a much more viable
issue in wrongful birth than in wrongful life. As one commentator has noted, "It is
questionable whether one who gives into his lusts in spite of possible claims of child
support in paternity suits, theological condemnation, social stigma, personal frustration
and guilt, possible criminal penalties, and the danger of venereal disease, is likely to be
deterred because of a possible 'wrongful life' action." Note, Damages-The Not So
Blessed "Blessed Event", 46 N.C.L. REV. 948, 954 n.26 (1968). This, of course, pertains
to only one type of wrongful life action. It would seem that for physicians the deter-
rent effect would be the same as in wrongful birth cases.
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it, legal reasons remain for denying, restricting, or diminishing the
damages claimed. Normally"8 in tort cases, the objective in measuring
damages is to achieve compensation," no more and no less.", The
purpose of compensation is to restore the wronged party to the posi-
tion he would have occupied, had the wrong not been committed."'
Clearly, in the wrongful birth situation," this is not an easy task: a
new life simultaneously brings with it both costs and comforts, none
of them easily assigned a price. Equally clear is the fact that the
plaintiff could most effectively be restored to his original financial
position by aborting the fetus or placing the child for adoption; such
a procedure would not only reduce the damages, but would
eliminate the need to evaluate the benefits conferred. Yet courts,
for the most part, have declined to use the basic legal principles
which would restrict recovery. They have awarded speculative
damages; they have misapplied the principle of offsetting benefits;
and finally, they have excused plaintiffs from mitigating their
damages. The result is the awarding to plaintiffs of more than the
requisite compensation. Thus, to prevent plaintiffs from being over-
compensated at the expense of defendants, courts recognizing a
cause of action and compensable injury must implement the rules of
law.
Perhaps the best solution is to restrict recovery to the costs of
pregnancy and delivery. This would limit damages to those which
can be assessed with reasonable certainty. Further, it would obviate
the need to subtract speculative benefits. Moreover, it would suc-
ceed in creating a deterrent" to negligent conduct without unjustly
128. The exception is punitive damages. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES ' 77 at 275
(1935) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. Punitive damages have been claimed in only
one wrongful birth action. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr.
463, 467 (1967).
129. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967); MCCORMICK,
supra note 128, § 137 at 560.
130. MCCORMICK, supra note 128, § 137 at 561.
131. Id.
132. The measure of damages in a wrongful birth action depends initially upon
whether the suit is brought as a tort or as breach of contract. In tort cases, liability is
limited only by the doctrine of proximate cause; in contract cases, on the other hand,
losses caused by the defendant's breach are also subject to the limitation of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854). That limitation is that special damages are not
recoverable unless they arise naturally from the breach or were reasonably within the
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made. In wrongful birth
cases, the distinction is of little significance, since a physician is uniquely in a position
to foresee the possible expenses his negligence might cause. But see LaPoint v.
Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976), in which the court denied the plaintiffs'
claim because the birth of an abnormal child was not a foreseeable consequence.
133. Punitive damages might increase the deterrent effect. -
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enriching the complainants. The alternatives to this approach pre-
sent possibly insurmountable problems of proof.
Ascertainability of Damages
An elementary principle of damages requires a plaintiff to
establish with reasonable certainty not only the existence of injury
but also the amount of damage." To some extent, this rule is an in-
sistence upon some factual basis a jury can use to fix damages
without conjecture and speculation."M It is generally held that where
the plaintiff can prove injury, but not its extent, he must prove the
amount only within reasonable certainty; in other words, he is not
held to mathematical precision.' The Supreme Court has inter-
preted this rule as requiring proof of facts from which the trier of
fact may infer a "just and reasonable" estimate of the extent of
damage. l ' Absent such a showing, the damage claims should be
dismissed as speculative."'8
Most wrongful birth decisions have not dealt with the issue of
whether damages can be determined with reasonable certainty.
Those which have addressed the question have done so only briefly,
most of them suggesting the rule presents no serious problems. 9
Claims such as lost wages, medical and hospital costs, and rearing
costs can be computed, these courts say, with some exactitude;'"
and although pain and anxiety involve more guesswork, they are
elements of damage which traditionally have been entrusted to
juries in other contexts.' Therefore, the conclusion of the courts is
that ascertainment of gross damages is a routine task, the only prob-
lems of conjecture being involved in application of the benefit rule...
to reach a net result.4 3
134. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS].
135. Id.
136. Hawkinson v. Johnston, 122 F.2d 724, 731 (8th Cir. 1941); Wilson v.
Farmers Chemical Assn., 444 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. App. 1969).
137. Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
138. Shannon v. Shaffer Oil & Ref. Co., 51 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1931); DOBBS.
supra note 134.
139. See, e.g., Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978);
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971). See also Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 704 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
140. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __ Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 169,
175 (1977).
141. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971).
142. See note 24 supra.
143. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 521 (1971).
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While suggesting that only the computation of benefits poses
difficulty, the court in Troppi added a defensive statement:
We do not, in the assessment of damages, require a
mathematical precision in situations of injury where, from
the nature of the circumstances, precision is unattainable.
Particularly this is true where it is defendant's own act or
neglect that has caused the imprecision."'
It is questionable, however, that in wrongful birth actions, the
defendant is responsible for the imprecision. The imprecise
damages, such as rearing costs and pain and suffering, are those
strictly within the control of the plaintiffs. The amount of suffering
is to a large extent a function of the plaintiffs ability or willingness
to deal with the problem emotionally. The Troppi court severely
lessened the burden of reasonable certainty by confusing causation
of injury with speculation in damage computation.
Taking the opposite approach on this issue, some courts have
correctly expressed concern that the alleged damages admit of
speculation."5 One case which stands definitely against awarding
speculative damages for wrongful birth is Coleman v. Garrison.""
There the court limited recovery to the readily ascertainable
damages attributable to childbirth, contending that any attempt to
assess rearing costs could only be "an exercise in prophecy, an
undertaking not within the specialty of our fact-finders.""4 7 Coleman
thus adhered strictly to the rule of compensating only what is prov-
able. Medical expenses incurred in the course of childbirth are prov-
able in the same manner as hospital and doctor bills in personal in-
jury cases. Likewise, loss of consortium within that limited time
frame is comparable to a determination in the personal injury con-
text. It is when the courts choose to extend recovery beyond
childbirth that damages become speculative.
Once courts undertake to assess damages beyond childbirth,
they enter the realm of speculation, especially with respect to the
frequently claimed'" damages for rearing and educating the unplanned
144. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 521 (1971) (emphasis
added). The same statement was made by the Supreme Court in Story Parchment Co.
v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
145. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974), affd, 349
A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
146. 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974), affd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
147. 349 A.2d 8 at 12.
148. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. - 260 N.W.2d 169
(1977); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). In Terre14 these were
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child. It is unclear whether those costs consist solely of bare
necessities or of support similar to that which other children in the
family receive. Two courts have apparently construed wrongful
birth complaints as demanding the latter, for the opinions speak of
"varying family environments"'49 and "standard of living."' 5 Under
the principle of taking the victim as one finds him, this would seem
to be the correct interpretation. However, it certainly invites and
necessitates more conjecture than would an approach compensating
only necessities. Moreover, the conjecture would be still greater
where the birth control failure resulted in the birth of a first child,
where a jury would not have the guidance of evidence of past per-
formance. 5' If the majority approach attempts to compensate for ex-
penses equal to those spent on previous children, those courts
should, at the very least, require evidence of the quality of food,
clothing, toys, medical and dental care, and living quarters which
the previous children enjoy. Otherwise, the award could only be
speculative, ignoring the individuality of the family.
Kindred problems are raised by the period of time over which
rearing costs are to be computed, as well as by the unpredictable
nature of education costs. Among other cases, Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic,' the most definitive statement on wrongful birth damages,
decreed that rearing costs were to extend to the child's majority.' s
This is patently inadequate, for a parent's obligation to provide
education may extend beyond the child's majority.'5' Furthermore,
because the age of majority varies from state to state, parents who
move to different states may incur substantial gains or losses. Most
significantly, education costs logically should reflect the ability of
the child. It is stating the obvious to say this cannot be evaluated
within the few years of birth allowed by statutes of limitations.
Therefore, because of the extensive costs of education,'" courts
the only damages claimed. The court's denial of recovery can possibly be explained
thereby. The narrow question, said the court, was "whether the parents of an un-
wanted child may recover only for the economic loss of rearing and educating such
child." 496 S.W.2d at 127.
149. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. 1974).
150. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
151. In a first child situation, however, the jury could have at its disposal any
of the various studies done on the costs of raising a first child; but again, these are only
averages. See note 169 infra
152. - Minn. __, 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977).
153. 1& at 176. See also Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511,
520 (1971).
154. See Hight v. Hight, 5 fI1. App. 3d 991, 284 N.E.2d 679 (1972).
155. The average cost in 1977 for four years of college education was $8,416.
Information provided courtesy of Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Washington, D.C.
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should give special attention to the speculation problems inherent in
claims for the costs of rearing and educating an unplanned child.
Speculation regarding the length of support and extent of
education is augmented in cases where the unplanned child is abnor-
mal. Although Sherlock dealt with damages arising from the birth of
a healthy child, the opinion alluded to parents' support obligations
for a defective child.1" Parents of a child with serious defects will be
legally responsible for his support even after he reaches majority.157
Thus, jurors would have to determine the child's life expectancy or,
at least, the number of years the child would live before his parents
died. On the other hand, severely defective children often die very
young; they may not require support to the age of majority. Hence,
life expectancy must be a fundamental determination in assessing
rearing costs for the wrongful birth cases involving abnormal
children. Similarly, education costs would inevitably be conjectural,
since they would reflect abilities and disabilities not yet measurable.
A physically handicapped child, for instance, might well complete a
college education. To evaluate such damages, jurors must become
something akin to fortune tellers.
While disallowing recovery for a normal, healthy child, some
courts grant damages for a defective one."' The theory underlying
such a result is that the amount of damage is there more clearly ap-
parent. However, such reasoning is questionable. Employing this
logic, two courts have limited recovery to those expenses which
reflect the difference between the costs of caring for a child with
birth defects and the costs of raising a normal child.15 9 According to
one court, these damages, including medical costs, are easily proved,
being similar to expenses in personal injury litigation. 16 This reason-
ing overlooks the fact that there is much speculation involved in
assessing the damages for rearing a normal child, and even more
156. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. ., 260 N.W.2d 169, 176
n.11 (1977).
157. See McCarthy v. McCarthy, 301 Minn. 270, 222 N.W.2d 331 (1974); Dehm
v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976).
158. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Thiemer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
159. See note 158 supra. Neither court has attempted to point out exactly
where the line is drawn between normal and abnormal. Thus, it is not clear how
physically or mentally defective a child must be before the parents can seek redress in
these courts. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of a system which more clearly "pits
parent against child," since in a borderline situation the parents would be forced to
argue the child's defects in order to recover. See note 115 supra and accompanying
text.
160. Jacobs v. Thiemer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 [1978], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss1/4
WRONGFUL BIRTH DAMA GES
speculation in determining the costs of rearing an abnormal child.
The difference, therefore, represents double speculation.
Declining to indulge in the speculative evaluation of defects,
the court in one case involving an abnormal child' denied all
recovery, holding that triers of fact cannot possibly compute the dif-
ferences between no life at all and life with defects:
In order to determine [the parents'] compensatory
damages a court would have to evaluate the denial to
them of the intangible, unmeasurable, and complex human
benefits of motherhood and fatherhood and weigh these
against the alleged emotional and money injuries. When
the parents say their child should not have been born,
they make it impossible for a court to measure their
damages in being the mother and father of a defective
child.'62
This holding astutely appreciates the problems of speculation in-
herent in assessing the costs and value of a human life which
parents allege they would rather have destroyed. It has the further
advantage of refusing to treat a young human life as defective mer-
chandise for which the disgruntled parents can receive a rebate.
Courts unwilling to distinguish between normal and defective
children could justifiably deny recovery on grounds of speculation.
Whether evaluating the damages of normal or abnormal
children, courts on the whole have ignored the speculative nature of
damages. In one case, the jury's verdict totalled $462,500;"3 in
another, the award was only $19,500;164 in still another, the jury did
not find damage."6 5 Troppi was settled out-of-court for $12,000 after
$250,000 damages were claimed;' 6  Sherlock was settled for
$17,000.6' Nevertheless, these striking disparities have commanded
161. In Jacobs, the claim was based on the doctor's failure to diagnose rubella
in the mother; in Gleitman, the doctor failed to advise the mother that her having had
rubella might result in birth defects. Both actions arose against a background of illegal
abortions in both states, prior to the decision of Roe v. Wade.
162. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).
163. See Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496, 498 (1976). The
Bowman verdict is somewhat misleading because twins were born, one of them with
defects. $12,500 of the award represents the father's claim for loss of consortium and
expenses.
164. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __ Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 169, 171
(1977).
165. See Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
166. Evening Star (Wash., D.C.), No. 12, 1971, at A4, col. 1.
167. 21 ATLA L. Rep. 190, citing letter from John F. Eisberg, St. Paul, Minn.,
counsel for plaintiff.
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no attention. Two jurisdictions have approved the use of the special
verdict to prevent excessive awards, ' " but no reported case has held
a verdict excessive. Apparently neither judges nor juries are quite
sure of what a just verdict should be. This confusion arises in part
from the speculative nature of wrongful birth damages.
The treatment of these speculative damages to date has been
unrealistically simplistic. Studies made by economists and statisti-
cians on the costs of children demonstrate the complexity of the
damage issue."9 In evaluating damages, factors to be considered
should include the geographic location, income level, and type of
residence of the plaintiffs.17 In addition, to compute rearing costs
with any accuracy, a jury would have to take into account the
economic principle of economies of scale: 7' obviously, the costs of
raising a first child are greater than those of raising a second, 7'
168. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 480 (1967);
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (1977); Martineau v.
Nelson, - Minn. __, 247 N.W.2d 409, 417 n.18 (1976).
169. See generally Reed & McIntosh, Costs of Children, 2 Research Reports,
Commission on Population Growth and the American Future 333-50.
170. Direct Cost of Raising a Child to Age 18 in the United States at 1977
Pricesa
(By region, cost level, and type of residence)
Farm costs
Region Low Moderate
Total U.S. $33,124 b  $4 8,988b
North Central 31,764 47,046
South 35,365 52,617
Northeast 32,382 45,840
West n/a n/a
Rural nonfarm costs
Region Low Moderate
Total U.S. $35,006 $53,830
North Central 31,675 47,237
South 34,415 55,173
Northeast 37,618 57,355
West 40,476 58,255
Urban costs
Total U.S. $35,261 $53,605
North Central 36,849 50,671
South 34,654 54,863
Northeast 31,861 53,586
West 38,243 56,065
a Undiscounted figures
b West excluded
Information provided courtesy of Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Washington, D.C.
171. See generally G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 146-160 (3d ed. 1966).
172. T. Espenshade, The Value and Cost of Children, 32 Population Bulletin 28
(Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1977).
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fifth, or tenth. Nearly all the wrongful birth cases involve plaintiffs
who are already the parents of numerous children.' Evaluation of
economies of scale would be complicated by the child's gender, since
availability of clothing and sleeping quarters would be related to the
sex of the unplanned child and those of his siblings. Complicated as
these inquiries might seem, they are necessary if plaintiffs are to
receive just compensation and defendants protected from excessive
verdicts based on speculation.
Unless complicated methods of proof are employed to aid them,
juries simply cannot avoid speculation in wrongful birth cases,
because they are neither economists nor fortune tellers.17 ' For the
most part, the damages cannot be known until the child is grown.
The issues are extremely complex, involving a multitude of factors
not within the fact-finders' expertise. The ensuing speculation is con-
trary to a basic principle of law which requires that a plaintiff prove
his damages within reasonable certainty. Therefore, courts recogniz-
ing a cause of action must either deny recovery altogether or
restrict it to reasonably ascertainable damages such as the expenses
of childbirth and delivery.175 Additional damages should be dismissed
as speculative. But because courts have declined to dismiss
speculative damages, virtually every type of damage imaginable has
been deemed recoverable.
Damages Recoverable
Unwilling to invoke the rule against speculation to deny
recovery, courts have granted a wide variety of damages. Although
many wrongful birth decisions deal with the issue of damages, few
are definitive. For the most part, courts have simply stated that
plaintiffs should recover all consequential damages proximately
caused by the defendants' negligence." Few types of alleged
damages have been deemed unworthy of recovery; one court even
went so far as to suggest additional damages it might award,'77
173. E.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967)
(tenth child); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8
(Del. 1975) (fifth child); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1970) (fourth child);
Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978) (third child); Troppi v.
Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (eighth child).
174. At the very least, an expert witness should be produced, but no reported
case speaks of such testimony.
175. See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8
(Del. 1975).
176. See, e.g., Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336, 340
(1975).
177. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967).
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assuming causation could be proved. In other negligent tort con-
texts, the principle of proximate cause constitutes a limitation on
the recoverable damages, but in wrongful birth this supposed limita-
tion is negligible. This is because the birth of an unplanned child in-
itiates interactions with numerous, varied interests. Thus, prox-
imate cause is not really a limitation, but rather an invitation to the
legal imagination. An examination of the damages presently
recoverable demonstrates that recovery in this unique tort area is
essentially unrestrained. For this reason courts should re-evaluate
their approaches to wrongful birth damages, in order to impose
some meaningful limitation on consequential damages.
Damages arising as consequences of the proximate cause of
negligence in wrongful birth actions include physical, emotional, and
financial injuries. Courts have recognized as damages the pain,
trauma, and injury of childbirth, as well as the mother's pain, ner-
vousness, and anxiety throughout pregnancy.""8 In addition, one
court has recognized the "physical inconvenience" of rearing the
child as a compensable injury. 7' Loss of consortium has been award-
ed for both wife and husband;" as a sort of extension of loss of con-
sortium, one complaint asked for the value of the wife's "society,
comfort, care and protection" lost to "other members of the family"
during and after confinement for the unplanned birth."' Moreover,
emotional damages often comprise the greater part of the amount
asked." Claims of emotional injury, however, are not confined to the
time of the unwanted pregnancy, as one might expect. Instead,
damages are now being awarded for the "emotional upset" involved
in rearing a child." Accompanying financial injuries naturally in-
clude the medical expenses of pregnancy and delivery."" Of course,
the most substantial financial damages are the costs of rearing and
educating the child; such damages are claimed in virtually every
wrongful birth case." Furthermore, lost wages have been approved
as damages,'" and opportunity costs have been deemed consequen-
178. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
179. See Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336, 340 (1975).
180. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. __, 260 N.W.2d 169
(1977). But see Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947).
181. Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496, 497 (1976).
182. See, e.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242
(1974), in which the claim of $300,000 was alleged to include both emotional stress and
rearing costs.
183. See Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336, 340 (1975).
184. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. __, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (1977).
185. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
186. Id.
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tial damages, if provable."' The indisputable trend is the seeking of
every type of damage imaginable.
In addition to those damages easily classified as physical, emo-
tional, or financial, some unorthodox damages have been alleged and
held compensable. In Bowman v. Davis," an unsuccessful tubal liga-
tion resulted in the birth of twins, one of whom was deformed.
Among the damages the parents asserted was the cost of "special
attention."" Still more uncommon was the request of compensation
for the fact that the mother "must spread her society, comfort, care,
protection and support over a large group."' This seems odd, in-
asmuch as the plaintiffs already had four children before the twins
were born.' Perhaps what underlies such a claim is a request for
the act of loving, or at least for the most basic maternal caring. If
this is so, a court should give serious consideration to requiring
mitigation of damages; if such is not the correct interpretation, the
allegation appears to state nothing more than the obvious. In any
event, Bowman represents an entry into a whole new realm of
recoverable claims.
The unorthodox damages claimed in Bowman are somewhat
analogous to a separate cause of action by the children for the
diminution in parental care occasioned by the addition of a new sib-
ling. Claims presented in this way have been unanimously unsuc-
cessful.'9 In one such case, the siblings' claim for loss of affection
was coupled with a claim for the reduction in family wealth. The
court denied that count, stating: "While children may expect future
care, affection, training and financial support, they have no vested
right to it .... There is no 'proportional' share of the parents' worldly
goods to which the children are entitled."'9 3 The sole distinguishing
factor between this correctly denied claim and that in Bowman is
the phrasing of the complaints. One court perceived the fallacy and
the other did not. It thus appears that by use of semantics, what
should not be recoverable can be phrased as an apparent consequen-
tial damage. Clearly, not every consequence of proximate cause in
this context should be treated as a recoverable damage.
187. See Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267
(1974).
188. 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
189. Id. at 497.
190. Id.
191. See i&
192. See, e.g., Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. App. 1974).
193. Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 840 (1974).
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Indeed, not all damages alleged in connection with wrongful
birth actions have been allowed, and foremost among those rejected
is the related count for wrongful life 94 often included in a wrongful
birth complaint. 95 In asserting a claim for wrongful life, the unplanned
child seeks compensation for wrongfully being born. Until recently,
these appended claims had met with universal disapproval.
However, New York at one time approved a combined recovery for
wrongful birth plus wrongful life.'" In a remarkable case, parents
had been advised inaccurately by their physician that a future baby
would not suffer from the same genetic defect as had their first
child. Relying on that advice, they had another child, who suffered
from the same hereditary kidney disease. The court, in granting the
infant's cause of action, held there is a "fundamental right of a child
to be born as a whole, functional human being." '197 Thus, the court
permitted recovery for injuries and conscious pain and suffering.
Notwithstanding this case, other wrongful birth plaintiffs seeking to
append damages for wrongful life have failed to obtain recovery.1 9
In the case standing most definitely against recovery for wrongful
life as an adjunct of wrongful birth, the court observed it could not
measure the value of life with defects against the value of no life at
all.'" Apart from the difficulty of measuring such damages, courts
should consider whether they are equipped to handle the possible
flood of litigation that may follow from labelling an individual's own
life a civil wrong."' If proximate cause is regarded as the sole limita-
tion on this type of litigation, wrongful life is certain to become a
usual appendage of wrongful birth recovery.
Wrongful death could also be alleged in connection with
wrongful birth, if the mother should die in childbirth from conse-
194. See note 5 supra.
195. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Clegg v.
Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (1977).
196. Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified,
Becker v. Schwartz, 47 U.S.L.W. 2426 (N.Y. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1978) (companion case to
Park v. Chessin).
197. Id. at 114. When the holding was modified, the "right" was rejected.
198. The usual reason for denial of recovery is the failure to state a recognized
cause of action. See, e.g., Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (1977).
199. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
200. If wrongful life is recognized as a claim against physicians who negligently
permit conception or birth to occur, it might also logically be granted against putative
fathers for siring the unplanned children. This was the claim in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41
Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), in which recovery was denied. If liability should
extend to putative fathers, it could also extend to mothers who fail to have abortions.
Given the frequency of illegitimacy in this country, an extensive amount of litigation
would certainly result.
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quences of the unplanned pregnancy. Such was the dicta in a Califor-
nia case °' in which the court enumerated damages it would deem
recoverable if proven to flow from the proximate cause in wrongful
birth. 202 The court plainly made no attempt to curtail the possible
varieties of recovery.
In fact, the only significant effort to restrict the types of
damages recoverable is the case of Coleman v. Garrison. 23 That deci-
sion allows only the following damages: (1) pain, suffering and
discomfort of the mother as the result of the pregnancy; (2) the cost
of the ineffective sterilization; (3) loss to the husband of the comfort,
companionship, services and consortium of his wife; however, loss of
consortium is limited to the loss arising from pregnancy and im-
mediately after birth; and (4) medical expenses incurred as a result
of the pregnancy."4 These limitations were based on principles of
public policy and the possibility of speculation. 5 This approach has
the further merit of not subjecting the child's life value to the
benefit rule,"6 which brings with it many complicated issues. Unfor-
tunately, Coleman stands alone in its approach to recoverable
damages.
Considering the multifarious damages recoverable in wrongful
birth, it is apparent that proximate cause presents no meaningful
limitation. Consequently, unless courts are to be inundated with
claims and defendants are to be burdened with enormous verdicts,
damages must be restricted in some way. A possible solution to this
problem is the Coleman approach, allowing recovery for only certain
types of damages. If this is not done, however, two other legal prin-
ciples are available. These are the rules of offsetting benefits and
mitigation of damages. While these rules could be used to lessen the
burden imposed on defendants, the courts for the most part ignore
or misapply the principles.
"Benefits Conferred"
The most controversial aspect of damage measurement in
wrongful birth litigation has developed as a result of the application
of the rule of offsetting benefits."7 As defined in the Restatement of
Torts, the rule states:
201. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
202. Id. at 476.
203. 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
204. d. at 761-62.
205. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 12 (Del. 1975).
206. See note 24 supra.
207. The rule of offsetting benefits is often confused with the rule of avoidable
consequences, or mitigation of damages. Thus, when courts speak of mitigating
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Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm
to the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has con-
ferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the interest
which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is
considered in mitigation of damages, where this is
equitable."8
While a number of courts have purported to endorse the use of this
rule of wrongful birth cases," no court has fully analyzed the "same
interest" limitation, a limitation which might well alter the recovery
granted in many jurisdictions.
Only two courts have ever addressed the Restatement's limita-
tion, and they have come to opposite conclusions. In a California
case,210 the plaintiff wife had submitted to a tubal ligation operation
to protect her physical condition. The court there applied the
benefit rule and determined that "[i]f the failure of the sterilization
operation and the ensuing pregnancy benefited the wife's emotional
and nervous makeup, and any infirmities in her kidney and bladder
organs, the defendants should be able to offset it." '' A careful
reading of the Restatement reveals the correctness of that ap-
proach. With several examples, it plainly states that the "interest"
is not the plaintiff, but the plaintiffs purposes. For instance,
damages alleged for pain and suffering cannot be offset by
pecuniary gain; similarly, damages for loss of consortium cannot be
diminished by a simultaneous absence of expenses.212 Perhaps even
more appropriate, by analogy, is the statement, "[O]ne who has
harmed another's reputation by defamatory statements cannot show
in mitigation ... that the other has been financially benefited from
their publication, unless damages are claimed for harm to pecuniary
interests. 11 3 Applying this to the wrongful birth context, it is evi-
dent that employment of the offsetting benefits rule necessitates
damages, they often are referring to the procedure of offsetting benefits. As used in
this note, the term "mitigation of damages" refers only to avoidable consequences, and
does not include offsetting benefits.
208. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 at 616 (1939) (emphasis added). See also
DOBBS, supra note 134, § 3.6; MCCORMICK, supra note 128, § 40.
209. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476
(1967); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204, 206 (1976); Troppi v.
Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517-18 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
__ Minn. .. 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (1977).
210. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rtpr. 463 (1967).
211. Id at 476.
212. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920, Comment b (1939).
213. Id
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determination of the purpose for which birth control was attempted.
Thus, the California case is an exact application of the principle
outlined in the Restatement.
The Restatement also demonstrates that benefits of one type
may not be converted to pecuniary benefits in order to satisfy the
principle. Yet in Sherlock, the only other case attempting to analyze
the rule, the court stated that such conversion of a child's society to
monetary amounts was entirely appropriate: the underlying purpose
of that limitation in the Restatement, said the court, was to prevent
unjust enrichment.2"4 While it is evident that such is the purpose of
the rule requiring subtraction of benefits, it cannot possibly be the
purpose of the "same interest" limitation, for the limitation restricts
the degree to which unjust enrichment can be eliminated. In view of
the substantial benefits accruing to parents in these actions, a blind
application of the benefit rule without regard to its limitation is
legally erroneous. Admittedly, the Restatement sets out a com-
plicated task, but the Sherlock approach is far too simplistic.
An accurate application of the benefit rule would require two
steps. First, the purpose of the birth control method must be ascer-
tained. In recognizing this, one court suggested that what should be
considered included "the diversity of purposes and circumstances of
the women who use . . . contraceptives." '215 Among the factors to be
evaluated, said the court, are "family size, family income, age of the
parents, and marital status."2 ' The court further recognized that the
conferred benefits will vary widely from case to case.217 However,
this approach omits the second step, application of the "same in-
terest" rule. This second step would necessitate separating both the
damages and benefits according to the "interest" affected, and sub-
tracting each benefit according to its type. Accordingly, physical
damages would be offset by physical benefits; emotional damages,
by emotional benefits; and financial damages, by financial benefits.
The first step, although never so defined, actually determines
whether injury exists, and, if so, its extent; then the second step
diminishes the damages by subtracting the benefits.
The potential benefits of a child, albeit unplanned, are many;2. 8
214. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (1977).
215. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971). The Troppi
analysis seems to go to the initial issue of whether injury has been incurred; however,
the court confined its remarks to the area of benefit.
216. Id at 519.
217. Id
218. See generally L. HOFFMAN & M. HOFFMAN. The Value of Children to
Parents, PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON POPULATION (J. Fawcett ed. 1973). Two
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however, most have not been specifically pointed out in the opinions.
The financial detriment incurred in raising a child could be offset by
his potential earning capacity.219 This would be similar to the deter-
mination of loss made in wrongful death actions."0 Additionally, the
child represents some financial security for the parents' old age."1
But courts have expressed more concern for emotional, rather than
financial, benefits.' Such advantages are certainly greater in
number and more diverse, although it must be remembered that
each case involves different considerations. Advantages occurring
most frequently are companionship, love and affection, fun and
avoidance of boredom, and the satisfaction of watching children
grow and develop.' These benefits, however, have been discussed
at length only by the courts which hold that benefits outweigh
psychologists at the University of Michigan have developed an elaborate value system
which enumerates eight categories of non-economic values of children: (1) Adult status
and social identity. Having children is tangible evidence of one's adulthood. This is
particularly true for women; many of them feel that raising a family is fulfillment of a
social role. (2) Expansion of the self, tie to a larger entity, "immortality." Because
children usually outlive their parents, children may provide parents with a sense of im-
mortality: parents' characteristics, embodied in their offspring, continue to live after
the parents have died. Also, children may contribute to their parents' personal growth
by unlocking latent emotions such as the feeling of being needed. (3) Morality. This
dimension refers to sacrifice for others. Children afford parents the opportunity to
subordinate self-interest for the good of the children. (4) Primary group ties, affilia-
tion. A family offers a sense of emotional security. While this has been true
throughout history, it is especially important in modern societies where increasing
geographic mobility and growing bureaucracy threaten individual identity. (5) Stimula-
tion, novelty, fun. The birth of a child generates a sense of something new and dif-
ferent happening. In so doing, it may help to dissipate the tedium of everyday life.
Playing with children can give parents pleasure and allow them, in a sense, to relive
their own youth. (6) Creativity, accomplishment, competence. The challenges of child-
raising may fulfill adult needs for creativity and achievement. (7) Power, influence, ef-
fectance. Having children enables parents to exert their influence to shape the lives of
others. (8) Social comparison, competition. Offspring may represent prestige or wealth,
as well as attesting to the parents' sexuality. Id. at 46-61.
219. See T. Espenshade, The Value and Cost of Children, 32 Population
Bulletin 20 (Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1977).
220. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 194 Ark. 938, 109 S.W.2d
1254 (1937); Siebeking v. Ford, 128 Ind. App. 475, 148 N.E.2d 194 (1958). See generally
Annot, 14 A.L.R. 485 (1950). Most courts in wrongful death actions permit recovery
for expected post-majority contributions of the child also.
221. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
222. For instance, in Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971),
the court mentioned the child's earnings as a potential benefit, but stressed the aid,
comfort, and society conferred. Id at 518.
223. T. Espenshade, The Value and Cost of Children, 32 Population Bulletin 20
(Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1977).
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damages as a matter of law."4 Unorthodox damages such as "change
in family status""2 would require offsetting of benefits such as sib-
ling companionship.22 Additional benefit in that regard might be the
potential help with housework an added child represents.' In any
event, benefits can be found to offset most types of damages.
The type of damage which, of course, lends itself least to offset-
ting by benefits is that involved in the physical disruption of life by
pregnancy and childbirth. While there is medical evidence that
pregnancy in general and breast-feeding in particular prevent cer-
tain types of cancer,' 2 that benefit is hardly provable in any par-
ticular case. Similarly, there is evidence that pregnancy heightens
sexual response and satisfaction;2 9 it would seem, therefore, that
loss of consortium might be offset if defendants chose to undertake
that aspect in discovery. Realistically, these physical benefits are
not likely to be proved. Thus, it appears that if any injury is to be
compensated without diminution, it is the physical pain and trauma"
of pregnancy and delivery. The rule of offsetting benefits would
have little application to such damages.
With one exception,21 applications of the rule have been made
without regard to the "same interest" limitation and governed by
exceedingly facile principles. The courts have declared that valuing
the aid, comfort, and society of a child is nothing extraordinary, as it
is traditionally done in wrongful death actions.21 ' They therefore en-
224. See, e.g., Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
225. Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496, 497 (1976). A similar
claim was made in Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976).
226. Companionship for previous children has been named, in a survey, as the
primary reason parents have for wanting more children. T. Espenshade, The Value
and Cost of Children, 32 Population Bulletin 22 (Population Reference Bureau, Inc.,
Washington, D.C., 1977).
227. Id. at 10.
228. S. KIPPLEY. BREAST-FEEDING AND NATURAL CHILD SPACING: THE ECOLOGY
OF NATURAL MOTHERING 3 (1974).
229. A. COLMAN & L. COLMAN, PREGNANCY: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE 48,
49 (1971).
230. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967).
231. Ironically, the two jurisdictions which contend most strongly that analysis
of benefits in wrongful birth can be handled the same way as losses in wrongful death
are the same jurisdictions which have revolutionzed wrongful death actions by inter-
preting "pecuniary" losses in their statutes to include loss of aid, comfort and society.
The upshot of this revised interpretation is to make the loss of life much greater in
value than the statutes suggested; yet in wrongful birth, the "benefits conferred" still
result in a net loss to the parents. Compare Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187
N.W.2d 511 (1971) and Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. .. 260 N.W.2d 169
(1977) with Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1962) and Wycko v.
Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
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dorse the procedure of subtracting the total benefits from the total
damages."2 This analogy with wrongful death, however, carries with
it certain difficulties. First, wrongful death actions proceed on the
theory that a life is worth more than the cost of its support;
wrongful birth assumes the opposite.233 Furthermore, there is dif-
ficulty in asking jurors to value as benefit the companionship of a
child whose companionship was unwanted. Finally, in wrongful
death actions, there is no possibility of psychological harm to the in-
dividual whose existence is valued: he will never learn how little or
how much he was worth. The unplanned child, on the other hand,
does not have the benefit of eternal ignorance on this issue.2" It is
this realization that has prompted a few courts to hold, on grounds
of public policy, that the damages must be outweighed by the
benefits. 5
The holding that benefits of parenthood outweigh the detri-
ments as a matter of law ignores the "same interest" limitation of
the benefits rule, for it does not attempt to classify the damages.
Such a holding is almost indistinguishable from a holding that no in-
jury has been suffered. Indeed, some decisions appear to say both at
the same time."' Those rationales were summarily rejected by
Sherlock, which stated it is "myopic to declare today that the
benefits exceed the costs as a matter of law." 7 Nevertheless, more
than one reason has been employed to support the conclusion. For
instance, one court has stated that the parents, in electing to keep
their child, have impliedly valued his benefits as outweighing his
detriments." Of course, this assumes that couples make detailed
economic calculations of the profits and losses children represent,
and therefore is entirely unrealistic. Other courts have taken a less
artificial stance, simply admitting that their holdings are grounded
on a desire to avoid valuing the life of a living person. For example,
the court in Coleman, while conceding net damage in the fact of
pregnancy, declined to find it in human life. "To make such a deter-
mination," said the court, "would, indeed, raise the unfortunate pros-
pect of ruling, as a matter of law, that under certain circumstances
a child would not be worth the trouble and expense necessary to
232. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 521 (1971).
233. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. - 260 N.W.2d 169, 177
(dissenting opinion).
234. See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. 1974).
235. I&
236. E.g., Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45 (Lycoming Cty. 1957).
237. __ Minn. __, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (1977).
238. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. 1974).
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bring him into the world." '39 Coleman therefore represents an honest
effort at compensation, and a sincere attempt to protect the child's
self-image. In one sense, it may be viewed as emotional, but on the
other hand, it is equally a refusal to weigh emotional factors.
Perhaps the most popular, and undoubtedly the most emotional
approach to valuing benefits has been the holding that the benefits a
child brings with him are invaluable: "Who can place a price tag on
a child's smile or the parental pride in a child's achievement?" ' Ac-
companying such statements have been suggestions that the
benefits are so intangible as to present "insurmountable problems of
proof." '1 It is possibly this recognition, coupled with concern for the
child's emotional well-being, that has led courts to hold that benefits
outweigh damages as a matter of law. Again, such a holding as a
matter of law fails to recognize the "same interest" limitation of the
Restatement.
If the particular benefits a child brings with him do not
outweigh the damages as a matter of law, then the valuing of
benefits is subject to the same objection as is the valuing of
damages: the benefits are conjectural and speculative. In fact,
benefits admit of even more speculation than do damages, for many
damages can be gleaned from human experience with children in
general. Benefits, on the other hand, pertain peculiarly to the par-
ticular individual. His intelligence, self-reliance, self-discipline, and
affection should all be taken into account. Yet this is not possible at
the stage at which a wrongful birth action is brought. On what can
the jurors base their valuation of the child's aid, comfort, and society?
Unquestionably, it can only be based upon a juror's experience with
other children.2"2 This is inappropriate for two reasons: first, the
child is unique; second, the benefit being weighed is the benefit to a
parent who has complained of being saddled with the unplanned
child. Even more than the valuation of rearing costs, therefore, the
valuation of benefits is "an exercise in prophecy."2 '3
239. Id
240. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
241. Id. at 127.
242. This is wholly unlike the evidentiary process in actions for the wrongful
death of a minor, in which plaintiffs can introduce evidence of the affection that ex-
isted between them and the deceased. See, e.g., Gardner v. Hobbs, 69 Idaho 288, 206
P.2d 539 (1949).
243. Cf. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 12 (Del. 1975) (evaluation of damages
labelled an exercise in prophecy).
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Despite any problems of speculation, the apparent trend in
wrongful birth cases is benefit-offsetting by the jury. By allowing
jurors to indulge in conjecture, and by disregarding the "same in-
terest" limitation, courts are ignoring some basic principles of
negligent tort law while professing to deal with wrongful birth as a
tort. At the same time, they are subjecting children to possible
psychological trauma. It would seem that the rule of offsetting
benefits in the wrongful birth context involves almost unmanageable
complexities and creates more problems than it solves. Without it,
however, the plaintiffs' compensation would certainly be over-
compensation. This is especially true since plaintiffs are permitted
to allege enormous damages without being required to mitigate
them.
Mitigation of Damages
While purporting to deal with wrongful birth in terms of or-
dinary tort principles such as proximate cause and offsetting
benefits, courts permitting recovery have almost universally excus-
ed plaintiffs from their usual duty to mitigate damages. Also known
as the avoidable consequences rule, this principle denies recovery
for any damages which could have been avoided by reasonable con-
duct on the plaintiffs part after a wrong has been committed by the
defendant.2" Application of the rule to wrongful birth actions would
possibly require a pregnant woman to abort the unplanned fetus, or
the parents of the unplanned child to offer him for adoption. If
either abortion or adoption were reasonable conduct, and the plain-
tiff failed to perform such conduct, recovery for damages such as
rearing costs could be denied. By refusing to apply this rule in
wrongful birth suits, courts remove the action from a true tort con-
text, allow unjust enrichment to accrue to plaintiffs, and impose an
unjust burden of damages upon defendants.
As defined in the Restatement of Torts and various treatises,
the rule of mitigating damages requires only reasonable conduct by
the plaintiff."' Construed in other tort contexts, reasonableness may
require a plaintiff to submit to painful treatment or even surgery.24
Thus, in the abortion situation, two questions arise: (1) How
dangerous is the operation? and (2) Would a reasonable person sub-
mit to it?
244. MCCORMICK, supra note 128, § 33.
245. DOBBS, supra note 134, § 3.7; MCCORMICK, supra note 128, § 33; RESTATE-
MENT OF TOhTS § 918 (1939).
246. See, e.g., Hendler Creamery Co. v. Miller, 153 Md. 264, 138 A. 1 (1927);
Potts v. Guthrie, 282 Pa. 200, 127 A. 605 (1925).
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Those questions are separated because abortion involves, for
some persons, moral and religious issues. It is clear that abortion is
not regarded as a "dangerous" operation,"' particularly when com-
pared to other forms of surgery."8 But even recognizing the number
of women who seek abortions, it is not so clear that abortion is for
every plaintiff in every situation a reasonable alternative. In other
tort cases, the question of whether a person with religious scruples
has acted reasonably is determined by a jury, in light of surround-
ing circumstances." 9 Yet in wrongful birth cases, rather than
deciding reasonableness on a case-by-case basis, some courts have
stated that abortion is so drastic a measure that it cannot be re-
quired of any plaintiff.25 Most interesting among these statements is
that of Troppi. There the court first spoke of the principle that "the
tortfeasor takes the injured party as he finds him," mentioning that
the women's mental and emotional makeup could be inconsistent
with aborting.251 However, the court then held that such an issue of
reasonableness should be withheld from the jury.252 Those two
statements are patently inconsistent. A more sensible conclusion
was reached in a New York case, where the court held that the
plaintiff must be given the opportunity to establish the cir-
cumstances surrounding her decision not to undergo an abortion.253
This approach thus comprehends what Troppi ignores: taking the
victim as one finds him does not mean taking the victim's word for
the reasonableness of his actions. Abortion may be unreasonable as
a matter of fact in many cases, but it is not necessarily unreasonable
as a matter of law.
While adoption seemingly would not entail the same moral and
religious objections inherent in abortion, courts have treated the
247. A. GUTTMACHER. W. BEST. & F. JAFFE, PLANNING YOUR FAMILY 185 (1964).
248. The Center for Disease Control states that legal abortion is safer than a
tonsillectomy, an appendectomy or pregnancy and childbirth. The death rate for legal
abortions performed during the first trimester of pregnancy was 1.7 per 100,000; for
tonsillectomy, 5 per 100,000; for appendectomy, 352 per 100,000. For childbirth and
pregnancy, the death rate was 13 per 100,000 live births.
249. The landmark case is Lange v. Hoyt, 114 Conn. 590, 159 A. 575 (1932), in
which the mother of a child injured in an automobile accident was a Christian Scien-
tist.
250. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971);
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (1977).
251. 187 N.W.2d at 520.
252. Id
253. Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
Reasonableness was all the more questionable in Ziemba, since the plaintiff was in-
formed of her pregnancy at four to four and one-half months after conception.
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two options identically, stating it would also be unreasonable to re-
quire parents to mitigate damages by offering the unwanted child
for adoption."5 The rationale is that many parents feel obligated to
raise their own children.255 Of course, such an approach is legally il-
logical. What a plaintiff "feels obligated" to endure is irrelevant;
reasonableness is the recognized and required standard of conduct.
Accordingly, if the plaintff's subjective obligation is not reasonable
conduct, damages should be denied for whatever consequences the
reasonable conduct might have avoided.
The reasonableness of adoption as a method of mitigating
damages is particularly conspicuous where the child involved is il-
legitimate. Certainly the damages accruing to a single, unwed
parent are greater than those in cases of married couples. ' For an
unwed mother there may be damage to reputation and additional
mental anguish. Furthermore, a single parent is much less likely to
be capable of supporting the child. Perhaps grappling silently with
these considerations, the only decision involving an illegitimate
wrongful birth dismissed the argument that the plaintiff should be
required to relinquish her child, but held that the triers of fact could
assess the "amounts chargeable" to the plaintiff under her duty to
mitigate damages. 57 By offering the question to the jury, the court
adhered to established principles of tort law. In light of the surround-
ing circumstances, adoption may well have been a reasonable alter-
native.
It has been suggested that adoption is viable as a method of
mitigating damages only if the unplanned child is normal, since an
abnormal child's chances of being adopted are negligible."5 ' This
argument does nothing to alter the basic principle that plaintiffs are
required to do only what is reasonable, in light of all the cir-
cumstances, and that juries determine what is reasonable. Jurors,
like parents, might well decide that offering an abnormal child for
adoption would result in his never having a home, and that doing so
would not constitute reasonable conduct. 5 ' Thus, the reasonableness
of adoption, even for abnormal children, can safely be left to a jury.
254. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __ Minn. _, 260 N.W.2d 169,
176 (1977).
255. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 2d 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971).
256. Id at 518.
257. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 659 (1976).
258. See Comment, Liability for Failure of Birth Control Methods, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 1187, 1203-04 (1976).
259. However, it is questionable that abnormal children really will not be
adopted. The Director on Adoption for the Child Welfare League of America has
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Part of the opposition to recognizing abortion or adoption as
reasonable conduct appears to lie in the belief that such measures
would inflict great emotional stress and harm upon the parents. But
although courts have acknowledged this possibility of mental pain
and anguish, 8 they have overlooked a corollary to the avoidable
consequences rule. That principle is that plaintiffs may recover for
harm they suffer in their reasonable efforts to reduce damages.2"'
Therefore, if the mitigating measure is reasonable, and the harm
suffered will be less expensive than the avoidable consequences, a
strict application of law not only requires that the steps be taken,
but also guarantees plaintiffs compensation for the anguish this
causes them.
Determining as a matter of law that mitigation will entail un-
due mental anguish seems an exceedingly subjective legal conclu-
sion. For parents who have endeavored not to have a child, pleaded
his birth as an injury to them, and alleged damages in tens or hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars, the suggestion of adoption should not
seem wholly unreasonable. Moreover, it should appeal to courts,
since courts are traditionally concerned with a child's best interests.
This is true for three reasons. First, in the domestic relations con-
text, children are assigned to homes with parents who want them.
Next, recent evidence indicates that adopted children fare better
than children living with their biological parents.262 Finally, the very
fact that a wrongful birth action was filed because of him may
adversely affect a child. This contingency would be obviated if the
unplanned child were adopted. When viewed objectively, adoption is
plainly a plausible solution to unwanted child support obligations.
Hence, it should not be held unreasonable as a matter of law on the
issue of mitigating damages.
Holding adoption unreasonable as a matter of law possibly con-
travenes public policy. Although public policy has not been addressed
on the issue of damage mitigation, courts have employed it to find
no injury; in so doing, some have mentioned the alternative of adop-
tion. For instance, one court pointed out, "Many people would be
willing to support this child were they given the right of custody
stated that the demand for adoptive children is now so great that even handicapped
and retarded youngsters can be placed. See Kwitny, Suicide, Motherhood and
Madness-But Not Adoption?, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1977, at 14, col. 6.
260. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.2d 511, 520 (1971).
261. See MCCORMICK, supra note 128, § 35.
262. See IQ., Culture and Adopted Children, SCIENCE NEWS, Sept. 3, 1977, at
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and adoption . . ,.". The court then concluded that awarding
damages would be against public policy.2 While this holding has the
defect of looking to the wrong source for public policy, 5 the same
holding can be based on policy as manifested in state statutes favor-
ing adoption of unwanted children.' Besides serving the significant
state interest of placing children with parents who truly want them,
viewing adoption as a reasonable mitigation measure has two more
advantages. First, it would significantly reduce the financial burden
imposed upon defendants, since rearing costs are often the major
part of the damages requested. Also, it might serve as a deterrent
to fraudulent claims. Parents who have decided subsequent to the
negligent act that they do desire an additional child would not be
compensated for what they no longer deem an injury. Public policy
for all these reasons affords courts a rationale for considering adop-
tion as a reasonable method of mitigating damages.
Interestingly, what has been viewed as public policy for pur-
poses of finding injury has been ignored when the issue is mitigation
of damages. To find the fact of damage, courts have pointed to the
decision in Roe v. Wade.17 Yet to reach the conclusion that mitiga-
tion of damages should not be required, they have bypassed the
notion that abortion is now considered a lawful alternative to child-
bearing. Troppi, decided before Roe, observed that abortion at that
time was still a felony in many jurisdictions; as a result, it could not
be considered a reasonable method of mitigation."' However, such is
no longer the case. Of course, this is not to say that whatever is
lawful is reasonable. The right to have an abortion cannot be con-
verted into an obligation to have one. 69 But what common and
statutory law declare lawful certainly cannot be summarily dismissed
as unreasonable as a matter of law.
To date the question of mitigating damages has been raised in
wrongful birth cases only in regard to abortion or adoption.
However, it would find application to damages other than the costs
of rearing and educating the child. For example, the principle might
also apply to mental pain and suffering. Thus, a plaintiff who pleads
263. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 46 (Lycoming Cty. 1957).
264. Id.
265. See note 83 supra.
266. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 710.1 et seq. (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
259.21 et seq. (1971).
267. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, _ Minn. __, 260 N.W.2d 169,
175 (1977).
268. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971).
269. Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1974).
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damages for the mental anguish involved in pregnancy or child-
raising might be required to seek psychiatric help. If such help is
less expensive than the allegedly injurious consequences, the defen-
dant would compensate the plaintiff for avoiding the consequences.
Furthermore, if opportunity costs are alleged as damages, the
parent might be required to send the child to a day-care center and
continue to work. Again, the defendant would be responsible for the
child care costs, if these were less than the lost wages. The possibility
of holding a defendant liable for opportunity costs points up the in-
herent injustice in holding mitigation measures unreasonable as a
matter of law. It seems inconceivable that a court would hold, as a
matter of law, that no mother should ever be required to remain
employed for the first few years of her child's life. Yet for many
women that is a moral obligation: it is what the mother "feels
obligated""27 to do. Therefore, under the present analyses, it would
appear that the refusal to return to work would be afforded the
same immunity as refusals to mitigate damages through abortion or
adoption. Such immunity for opportunity costs would invite fraud by
guaranteeing plaintiff mothers paid vacations from employment,
without inquiry into their motives. Unless the mitigation issue is
submitted to the jury on all damages questions, unjust enrichment
will inevitably result from the verdict.
If courts do not defer the mitigation question to the juries,
they are not treating wrongful birth as the simple negligence action
they suggest it is. To hold as a matter of law that plaintiffs are not
required to avoid huge consequential damages allows plaintiffs to
take advantage of one side of tort law. Moreover, it imposes an un-
just financial burden on defendants. The major problem with such
an approach is that it assumes too much. It may be that mitigation
measures such as abortion and adoption are unreasonable for some
parents, or for most parents, but such measures are not always
unreasonable as a matter of law. For this reason, the surrounding
circumstances of each case should be examined, as should the
motives of plaintiffs in failing to mitigate damages. Under the view
that mitigation is unreasonable, evidence that a plaintiff had willfully
abandoned a previous child, or had campaigned for less stringent
abortion laws, would not even be admissible for impeachment pur-
poses, since the motives are deemed irrelevant. If pregnancy and
child-raising are as injurious as plaintiffs suggest in their com-
plaints, inquiry into their motives for not lessening those injuries
270. Cf. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971) (holding
adoption unreasonable because parents feel obligated to raise their own children).
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seems completely appropriate. Mitigation is perhaps the most effec-
tive vehicle courts can use to prevent unjust enrichment. In view of
the vast potential liability with which defendants may be en-
cumbered, every method of diminishing damages, including mitiga-
tion, should be employed.
POTENTIAL LIABILITY
Although courts71 and commentators 2 have attempted to make
it such, wrongful birth is not an ordinary tort. It is one thing to com-
pensate destruction; it is quite another to compensate creation. This
so-called "wrong" is unique: it is a new and on-going condition.7 As
life, it necessarily interacts with other lives. Indeed, it draws its "in-
jurious" nature from the predilections of the other lives it touches. It
is naive to suggest that such a situation falls neatly into conven-
tional tort principles, producing neatly calculable damages.
The damages-in fact, the issues-flowing from the elements of
the wrongful birth cause of action have just begun to be litigated. In
the exercise of judicial activism, courts have opened a veritable
floodgate. Those courts denying recovery, and one court which
granted it, have recognized this. In Rieck, the court prohibited
recovery on grounds, inter alia, that the tort "would enter a field
that has no sensible or just stopping point."' ' An examination of the
potentials of wrongful birth liability evidences the validity of the
Rieck proposition.
The possible damages yet to be alleged in the context of birth
control failure are staggering. Courts have already alluded to the
damages incurred in "replan[ning] family life."" Therefore, it does
not seem unreasonable to predict that more mothers will allege and
recover opportunity costs-that is, the value of their lost career op-
portunities. 6 Moreover, the injury incurred in replanning family life
would undoubtedly be greater in the case of a single, unwed mother.
271. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967);
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
272. See, e.g., Comment, Liability for Failure of Birth Control Methods, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1204 (1976).
273. Perhaps the closest analogy in ordinary tort law is that of a personal in-
jury which leads to other injuries before it heals.
274. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245
(1974). Accord, Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462-63 (1976).
275. Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204, 205 (1976).
276. The Rockefeller Commission has estimated these costs at $40,000. Report,
Population and the American Future 80 (1972). However, this is only an estimate, and
would vary with the education and skills of the individual.
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As one court mentioned, hypothetically, an unwed college coed
might become pregnant as the result of a negligently filled birth
control prescription. 7 This foreshadowed the case of Stills v. Grat-
ton,74 in which a doctor performed an unsuccessful abortion on an
unwed college student. Naturally, the damages suffered by such a
plaintiff would have to include opportunity costs, unless the woman
could complete her education uninterrupted. In that case, however,
someone else would have to care for the child. Day care center costs
might therefore be granted, as well as the cost of a babysitter while
the student did her homework. Carried to its logical conclusion, the
doctrine of proximate cause might necessitate the granting of
damages if the student's grades suffered as a result of the
negligence. Thus, "replanning family life" may have far-reaching
ramifications.
These costs of replanning a lifestyle might also logically include
damages for the loss of freedom the parent or parents experience
with the addition of a new family member. A baby requires much at-
tention which parents might rather devote to other activities. The
encumbrance of freedom is certainly one reason many couples
choose not to have children.2 79 For such persons, child-raising may
represent a lower status;' thus, damages for that sort of mental
suffering might be claimed.
Replanning family life necessarily encompasses replanning the
household. The addition of an unplanned child to a family of several
members might logically require the addition of another room to the
home, or even another home. If another home is required, moving
expenses would also be involved. Similarly, the family car might
prove inadequate. If the measure of tort damages is applied strictly,
such consequences are unmistakably compensable. The greatest
limitation on damages is plainly the attorney's imagination."'
277. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971).
278. 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976).
279. See What Life Is Like with Twelve Children .. . Two . . . None, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 4, 1976, at 60.
280. See Nobody Home: The Erosion of the American Family, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, May, 1977, at 43.
281. In Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __ Minn. ., 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977),
the court expressed its hopes that attorneys themselves would curtail wrongful birth
litigation: "It is therefore our hope that future parents and attorneys would give
serious reflection to the silent interests of the child and, in particular, the parent-child
relationships that must be sustained long after legal controversies have been laid to
rest." Id. at 177.
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Even if recovery were limited to the costs of pregnancy and
delivery, courts could be faced with multitudinous claims. A first-
time mother could surely sue her negligent physician for a new
maternity wardrobe, as well as for any educational materials she
might require. In the event of stretch marks, or a Caesarean section,
damages for disfigurement might be alleged. Were the pregnant
woman to consume more food than usual, or unusually expensive
food during pregnancy, the doctor would be liable, under the doc-
trine of proximate cause, for the added food costs. Furthermore,
because the defendant must take his plaintiff as he finds him,"2 it
would appear that the parents might choose among delivery options
such as midwifery or natural childbirth, and the defendant would
have to compensate them for any additional costs their option entailed.
An even broader scope of damages might be realized once the
psychological aspects of pregnancy are fully litigated. While adverse
complications are possible in any pregnancy, they are much more
likely to occur in unwanted pregnancy.2" Besides the mental injury,
there could be physical symptoms with possibly lasting effects.2"
Moreover, psychological trauma could be claimed by both parents.285
Psychiatric care could, therefore, constitute a major aspect of
recovery.
Like potential damages, the potential contexts of wrongful
birth are virtually limitless. A recent suit, for example, charges the
defendant in an automobile accident with causing the plaintiffs
Fallopian tubes to become untied; as a result, the plaintiff alleges,
she later conceived a child.' In a different situation, the pregnant
woman herself might be the defendant: with the recent abrogation
of interspousal immunity, 7 there would be nothing to prevent a
disgruntled husband from bringing a wrongful birth action against
282. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971).
The Troppi court construed the rule to mean the defendant must accept a subsequent
choice of the plaintiff.
283. See generally A. MCFARLANE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDBIRTH (1977).
284. See generally S. CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH
(1973).
285. See generally A. COLMAN & L. COLMAN, PREGNANCY: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
EXPERIENCE (1971).
286. This case, entitled Howard v. Schneider Transport, was filed in Lake
Cohnty, Indiana, on June 2, 1976. It is now pending in Porter County, Indiana (Cause
No. 77-PSC-345).
287. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102
(1962); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Immer v. Risko, 56
N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970).
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his wife for her negligent failure to take birth control pills. The
hypothetical husband could seek to absolve his duty to support an
unwanted child proximately caused by his wife's negligence. The ap-
parent absurdity of these cases does not diminish their very real
possibility.
More readily apparent, perhaps, is the prolific nature of the
cases in which a physician fails to inform his patient of the
possibility that the child she is carrying may be born with defects.2"
How far that duty will be carried is undetermined. Must a physician
inform every mother-to-be, for instance, of the possibility of
Mongolism, in case the woman would decide to abort?' "a Is a physi-
cian now required to delve into the genetic structure of his patients?
Recognizing this potential liability, one court denied the parents'
cause of action, refusing to impose upon all obstetricians the duty of
becoming forced genetic counselors. '89 The majority reasoned that
recovery would make the physician an insurer of the genetic health
of newborns.' Such a burden is apparently the trend."
Another potential burden lies in the unsuccessful vasectomy
situation. There is no reason to believe that each man who has a
vasectomy has one sexual partner; a single man might sire more
than one child before the negligence is discovered. In such a case,
the physician would be burdened with the consequential damages of
promiscuity, since a strict application of proximate cause theory
would render the doctor wholly liable.
From these real and hypothetical examples, two observations
are clear. First, unless some restriction is placed on recovery,
wrongful birth damages will proliferate. Second, bearing the brunt
of that proliferation will be not only the defendants, but also the
general public, due to the costs of malpractice insurance. 2 Even
more disturbing, especially for population planners, should be the
fact that studies reveal physicians became reluctant to perform
sterilizations following the initial wrongful birth cases." Therefore,
288. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
288a Apparently he must do so, at least where the mother is over thirty-five
years of age. See Becker v. Schwartz, 47 U.S.L.W. 2426 (N.Y. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1978).
289. Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (1976).
290. Id.
291. See notes 196 and 197 supra and accompanying text.
292. See generally Makovsky, Malpractice and Medicine, Society, Jan.IFeb.,
1977, at 25.
293. See Note, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 415 (1965).
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in granting damages because public policy favors family planning, 29'
the courts may be thwarting that very policy.
Much of the proliferation of damages in this context is simply a
reflection of the "take your victim as you find him" approach taken
by most courts. The exploration of individual idiosyncracies will in-
evitably lead to more and more damages. Prohibition of recovery,
restriction of recovery, or mitigation of damages would serve to
relieve the situation. Absent any limitation, the cause of action
clearly has "no sensible or just stopping point."2'5
CONCLUSION
Wrongful birth is not an ordinary tort, and, while it is apparent
that some injury does exist, there are substantial public policy
reasons for limiting recovery or denying the cause of action
altogether. The wrongful birth cause of action is one previously
unknown at common law; because it involves significant moral
issues, it would best be left to legislative bodies, where a full debate
can take place. Most courts, however, have been unwilling to invoke
either process or policy considerations to deny recovery. The result
of their treatment of wrongful birth has been the granting of
speculative damages, offset by speculative benefits, without regard
to basic principles of law. While ostensibly treating wrongful birth
as a simple negligent tort, the courts actually pick and choose
among various tort principles. Such an approach encourages fraud
and provides unjust enrichment by permitting plaintiffs to forego
their usual duty to mitigate damages-in this situation by either
abortion or adoption. Hence, it is not only an unwarranted attempt
at judicial legislation, but also an inadequate one.
The potential impact of this judicial activism is not yet known.
The problems inherent in damage calculation are only beginning to
evolve; the action is still rather young. By not restraining recovery,
the courts are unleashing litigation which brings with it un-
precedented and possibly untamable damages.
Dierdre A. Burgman
294. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971).
295. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245
(1974).
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